The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and Convincing Evidence as the Burden of Proof by Husseini, Richard
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Adopting Clear and Convincing Evidence
as the Burden of Proof
Richard Husseinit
INTRODUCTION
In 1984 Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (the
"Act")' in response to the widely held view that defendants who
committed similar crimes, under similar circumstances, were re-
ceiving grossly disproportionate sentences in federal courts.2 The
Act established the Federal Sentencing Commission (the "Com-
mission") to promulgate mandatory sentencing guidelines (the
"Guidelines") for federal judges.' After long debates, the Commis-
sion promulgated the Guidelines, which took effect in November
1987.4
For drug and money crimes,5 the Guidelines require a trial
judge to make, at sentencing, an independent determination of the
amount of contraband involved in the transaction. Additionally,
the trial judge must determine whether certain aggravating or mit-
igating circumstances exist. The Guidelines are silent, however, as
to what standard of proof the trial judge should apply in determin-
ing the actual amount of drugs or money involved or in determin-
ing whether aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist.
t B.S. 1988, The University of Dallas; J.D. Candidate 1991, The University of Chicago.
I Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1988, codified at 18 USC
§§ 3551-3742 (1988) and 28 USC §§ 991-98 (1988).
2 United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch 1
at 2 (West, 1990) ("Guidelines Manual"). See also Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361
(1989); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 41
(1983). References to chapter 1 of the Guidelines Manual are to the official introduction. All
other references use section numbers.
3 S Rep No 98-225 at 63 (cited in note 2).
4 To avoid constitutional challenge as an ex post facto law, courts applying the Guide-
lines sentence a defendant based upon the sentencing regime in effect at the time of the
commission of the crime. Thus, the Guidelines only apply to crimes committed after No-
vmber 1, 1987. If, however, the Guidelines result in a more favorable sentence than the pre-
Guidelines' regime, then they will apply to crimes committed on or before that date. Guide-
lines Manual § 10.1 (cited in note 2).
1 See, for example, id at §§ 2B1.1-2B1.4, 2B5.1-2B5.4, 2D1.1-2D3.4.
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Supplementary sources indicate that this silence is inten-
tional.6 Courts addressing the issue have acknowledged the silence
of the Guidelines and have adopted preponderance of the evidence
as the standard of proof.7 This Comment argues that preponder-
ance is not the proper standard; instead, judges should use clear
and convincing evidence as the standard of proof when applying
the Guidelines.
Section I explains the Guidelines' basic structure, demon-
strates that a judge is not limited to the quantities of drugs or
money proven at trial in sentencing a defendant, and shows that
the Guidelines do not prescribe any standard of proof. Section II
examines the constitutionality of using a preponderance standard
to resolve disputes over the amount of contraband or over the
presence of any aggravating or mitigating factors, and concludes
that under current Supreme Court jurisprudence it is not clear
whether preponderance satisfies due process. Section III argues
that, because of this ambiguity, a general due process analysis
must be employed to determine the appropriate standard of proof
under the Guidelines. This analysis supports adopting a clear and
convincing standard.
I. STRUCTURE OF THE GUIDELINES
A. Real versus Charge Offense Sentencing
The Guidelines' stated goals are honesty, uniformity, and pro-
portionality in sentencing." Implementing a system that met these
goals proved quite difficult for the Commission. Two competing vi-
sions of the Guidelines had to be balanced: charge offense sentenc-
ing and real offense sentencing.9 Charge offense sentencing imposes
sentences based solely "upon the conduct that constitutes the ele-
ments of the offense with which the defendant was charged and of
which he was convicted."' 10 Real offense sentencing considers "the
6 See text at notes 33-35.
See, for example, United States v Koonce, 884 F2d 349 (8th Cir 1989). See text at
note 36.
8 Guidelines Manual ch 1 at 2 (cited in note 2).
For a thorough treatment of how the Commission resolved this conflict in the Guide-
lines, see Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L Rev 1 (1988). See also Charles J. Ogeltree, Jr., The Death of
Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101"Harv L Rev 1938 (1988);
Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L
Rev 83 (1988).
10 Guidelines Manual ch 1 at 5 (cited in note 2).
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actual conduct in which the defendant engaged regardless of the
charges for which he was indicted or convicted."11
The Commission rejected a real offense system, but it did not
adopt a pure charge offense system either. In some instances the
Guidelines dictate that the trial judge is to consider aspects of the
defendant's conduct not formally proven at trial. Two examples
are determining the amount of contraband and identifying any ag-
gravating or mitigating circumstances for drug and money related
crimes.12
B. Calculating the Adjusted Base Offense Level for Drug and
Money Crimes
A trial judge considers two factors in sentencing convicted de-
fendants: the particular crime and the criminal history of the de-
fendant." Under the Guidelines, the sentencing range for a given
crime/criminal history combination is very narrow,1" and a judge
may depart from this prescribed range only in limited
circumstances.15
The Guidelines provide matrices listing the appropriate sen-
tencing range for a defendant, based on the particular crime and
the defendant's criminal history. To apply the Guidelines' matri-
ces, the court must convert the particular offense into a numerical
value, referred to as the "adjusted base offense level." The ad-
justed base offense level has two components: the "base offense
level" and "adjustments" to that level. The base offense level is a
numerical value assigned to the particular federal crime.- Adjust-
ments upward or downward depend on the existence of specific
" Id.
' Id at § 1B1.3. This is the Guidelines' "relevant conduct" provision. As the next sec-
tion explains, this provision dictates to the trial judge what evidence to consider in deter-
mining, for sentencing purposes, the actual amount of drugs or money involved in the crime.
" Id at § 1B1.1. See also 18 USC § 3551. To calculate the criminal history category for
a particular defendant, the Guidelines assign points to the defendant's prior convictions
based primarily on the length of prior imprisonment. A judge may not include in his calcula-
tions crimes committed many years ago. The total points determine the criminal history
category. For the purposes of this Comment, the criminal history category has little impor-
tance. For further reference, see Guidelines Manual §§ 4A, 4B.
1I Specifically, "the maximum of any range cannot exceed the minimum by more than
the greater of 25 percent or six months." Id, ch 1 at 1 (citation omitted).
I"[T]he new sentencing statute permits a court to depart from a guideline-specified
sentence only when it finds 'an aggravating or mitigating circumstance ... that was not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission . . . ."' Id, ch 1 at 6
(citations omitted).
11 See id at §§ 1B1.I-1B1.2.
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factors listed in the Guidelines. 17 For example, if a defendant ac-
cepts responsibility for his actions, the court is to adjust his base
offense level downward.'8 Or, if a defendant is the leader or organ-
izer of the criminal activity,' or has knowledge of the extreme vul-
nerability of his victim,20 then the court is to adjust upward.
For drug and money crimes, the quantity of the contraband
determines the base offense level."' Two basic methods of deter-
mining the amount of contraband are possible. The first resembles
a charge offense method: the judge determines the level based
upon the amount of contraband specified in the count on which
the defendant was found guilty. The second resembles a real of-
fense method: the judge makes an independent finding, at sentenc-
ing, of the quantity of drugs or money involved. The Guidelines
dictate that the judge use the second method, and courts consider-
ing the issue have unanimously interpreted the Guidelines this
way.22
To better understand this issue, it is necessary to consider the
interrelationship between two provisions of the Guidelines. If a
trial court convicts a defendant of a crime that is within a specifi-
cally defined subset of crimes, § 3D1.2 provides for the aggregation
17 This description oversimplifies the Guidelines. Actually, there are three components:
the base offense level, specific offense characteristics, and adjustments to the base offense
level. Adjustments in the technical sense apply to factors that are mitigating or aggravating
circumstances for all federal crimes. Specific offense characteristics are mitigating or aggra-
vating circumstances unique to a particular crime. For theoretical purposes these are the
same; the Comment treats them together for discussion and denotes them collectively as
"adjustments."
" Guidelines Manual § 3El.1 (cited in note 2). This Comment does not discuss adjust-
ments that lower the sentence of the defendant. Such adjustments are not themselves free
from controversy; case law consistently has held that the defendant bears the burden of
establishing a mitigating factor to adjust downward his base offense level. See, for example,
United States v Urrego-Linares, 879 F2d 1234 (4th Cir 1989).
19 Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1 (cited in note 2).
20 Id at § 3Al.1.
21 See, for example, id at §§ 2B5, 2D1.
22 See, for example, United States v Blanco, 888 F2d 907 (1st Cir 1989); United States
v Guerra, 888 F2d 247 (2d Cir 1989); United States v Ryan, 866 F2d 604 (3d Cir 1989);
United States v Williams, 880 F2d 804 (4th Cir 1989); United States v Taplette, 872 F2d
101 (5th Cir 1989); United States v Sailes, 872 F2d 735 (6th Cir 1989); United States v
White, 888 F2d 490 (7th Cir 1989); United States v Koonce, 884 F2d 349 (8th Cir 1989);
United States v Shorteeth, 887 F2d 253 (10th Cir 1989); United States v Scroggins, 880
F2d 1204 (11th Cir 1989). In United States v Restrepo, 883 F2d 781 (9th Cir 1989), the
Ninth Circuit held that the judge must determine the base offense level solely by looking at
the quantity of drugs stated in the count on which the defendant was found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. However, the Ninth Circuit has withdrawn its first opinion in Restrepo,
896 F2d 1228, and issued a new opinion agreeing with the approach of the other circuits, 903
F2d 648 (9th Cir 1990).
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of the crimes for sentencing.23 The rationale behind this provision
is that if the crimes are so interrelated that they constitute a single
harm, it is inequitable to sentence the defendant separately for
each offense.2 Drug and money crimes qualify for aggregation
under § 3D1.2; if a court convicts a defendant of two drug crimes,
the court will add the quantities involved to determine the base
offense level.
Under § 1B1.3, if the convicted defendant's crime would qual-
ify for aggregation under § 3D1.2, a court is to consider all actions
part of the same course of conduct in determining the base offense
level.25 That the defendant has not been convicted beyond a rea-
sonable doubt for the other conduct at issue is not relevant.
The Guidelines' Commentary to § 1B1.3 addresses this precise
situation:
Subsection (a)(2) provides for consideration of a broader
range of conduct with respect to one class of offenses .... The
distinction is made on the basis of § 3D1.2(d), which provides
for grouping together (i.e., treating as a single count) all
counts charging offenses of a type covered by this subsection.
However, the applicability of subsection (a)(2) does not de-
pend upon whether multiple counts are alleged .... Simi-
larly, in a drug distribution case, quantities and types of drugs
not specified in the count of conviction are to be included in
determining the offense level if they were part of the same
course of conduct or part of a common scheme or plan as the
count of conviction.28
" The relevant part of the rule reads: "All counts involving substantially the same
harm shall be grouped together into a single Group." Guidelines Manual § 3D1.2 (cited in
note 2). The specifically defined subset of crimes includes "[c]ounts [that] are grouped to-
gether if the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or
loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of aggregate harm... ." Id
at § 3D1.2(d).
U An example given in the Guidelines is a defendant's forging and uttering the same
check. Not grouping the two counts together would result in the defendant's receiving two
punishments for what is essentially one crime. Id at § 3D1.2, application note 3, example(i).
25 Specifically, the section states:
Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range)
(a)... the base offense level where the guideline specifies more than one base offense
level, . . . (2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would
require grouping of multiple counts, all such acts and omissions that were part of the
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction ....
Id at § 1B1.3.
2" Guideline3 Manual, Background Commentary to § 1B1.3 (cited in note 2) (emphasis
added).
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As long as the drugs or money are part of the same course of con-
duct, the trial judge considers the entire quantity involved, regard-
less of whether this quantity was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial. 7
C. The Guidelines Do Not Prescribe a Standard of Proof
Thus, at sentencing, a judge must make an independent find-
ing of the quantity of contraband involved in the defendant's of-
fense. In determining adjustments, the judge relies on circum-
stances of the defendant's crime not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial.28 The question of the appropriate standard of proof
thus arises. While they do not specify the standard of proof trial
courts should apply in determining the base offense level or adjust-
ments, the Guidelines do provide a procedure for arriving at the
proper sentence. A probation officer first completes a presentence
report, containing the calculation of the appropriate Guidelines'
sentence.2 9 For example, if the defendant is convicted of a drug
crime, the probation officer will determine the quantity of drugs
involved in the same course of conduct. Likewise, based on his in-
vestigation (including the trial court record), the probation officer
determines whether the defendant led the activity or any other
facts that might cause an adjustment to the base offense level.
While the presentence report indicates the probation officer's
suggested sentence, both the government and the defendant can
dispute any of the probation officer's findings. The Guidelines pro-
vide that:
When any factor important to the sentencing determination is
reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate
17 The Sentencing Commission's Trainer's Manual provides a specific example. The
government initially charges a defendant with two drug counts, later dismisses one of the
counts, and the defendant pleads guilty to the other. If the drugs alleged in the dismissed
count were part of the same course of conduct as the offense for which the defendant was
convicted, then the judge is to add the quantity of drugs from the dismissed count to the
quantity in the convicted count to determine the base offense level. See United States Sen-
tencing Commission, Trainer's Manual, Relevant Conduct Packet, Quiz 2, 4 (GPO, 1989).
28 Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(2), quoted in note 25, applies to activities used in
calculating the base offense level, as well as adjustments to the base offense level. Thus, the
question regarding burden of proof applies both to evidence determining the base offense
level and evidence supporting an adjustment to the base offense level.
21 Id at § 6Al.1. The judge uses this report as the basis for his determinations. If
neither side disputes allegations in the presentence report, the court accepts them without
any hearing. For a discussion of the role of the presentence report in sentencing, see United
States v Palta, 880 F2d 636 (2d Cir 1989); Note, A Proposal to Ensure Accuracy in
Presentence Investigation Reports, 91 Yale L J 1225 (1982).
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opportunity to present information to the court regarding that
factor.... [T]he court may consider relevant information...
provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliabil-
ity to support its probable accuracy. 0
The Commentary to this section explains that the court should re-
solve many of these factors in an informal fashion and need not
always conduct a sentencing hearing.81 The Guidelines leave vari-
ous procedural details open: "the sentencing court must determine
the appropriate procedure in light of the nature of the dispute, its
relevance to the sentencing determination, and applicable case
law."32 Because the Commission did not specify a burden of proof
for sentencing determinations, this decision is also apparently left
to the court's discretion.
A proposed version of the Guidelines would have required a
judge to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard in resolv-
ing disputed sentencing factors 33 but the final version did not con-
tain such a provision. In the Supplemental Report to the Guide-
lines, the Commission noted that the proper standard of proof was
the type of sentencing factor that trial courts would have to resolve
themselves. The Commission realized that the existing law "ad-
dressing dispute resolution ... remains to be developed fully,"
3 4
and thus implied that as case law developed under the Guidelines,
courts would determine the requisite standard of proof
3 5
30 Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3 (cited in note 2).
31 Id, Commentary to § 6A1.3.
32 Id.
33 United States Sentencing Commission, Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines
for the United States Courts, 51 Fed Reg 35080, 35085 (1986). In adopting the preponder-
ance standard, the Preliminary Draft tried to impose practices and "doctrines that were
developed for a system of discretionary sentencing" on a new system which is "animated by
considerations that are necessarily different from, and seen antithetical to the considera-
tions that inhere in the new, determinate system." Harvey M. Silet and Susan W. Brenner,
Commentary on the Preliminary Draft of the Sentencing Guidelines Issued by the United
States Sentencing Commission in September, 1986, 77 J Crim L & Criminol 1069, 1079
(1986).
31 United States Sentencing Commission, Supplementary Report of the Initial Sen-
tencing Guidelines and Policy Statements, in Thomas W. Hutchinson and David Yellen,
Federal Sentencing Law and Practice 200-02 (West, Supp 1989).
"I Some supplementary materials indicate that the Commission did contemplate a more
definite standard of proof. For example, in testimony before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Sentencing Commissioner Stephen Breyer indicated that the proper standard for
a judge to apply in resolving a disputed sentencing factor was preponderance of the evi-
dence. Testimony of Sentencing Commissioner Stephen Breyer Before the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, reprinted in Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Sentencing Guidelines 830
(PLI, 1987). Additionally, a Federal Judicial Center committee explained that before the
Guidelines, preponderance of the evidence was the appropriate standard for disputed fac-
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The Guidelines ultimately leave the burden of proof to a trial
judge's discretion. In exercising this discretion, courts have gener-
ally adopted preponderance of the evidence as the burden of proof
at sentencing, 6 reasoning as follows: First, due process does not
require a standard of proof higher than preponderance of the evi-
dence.3 7 Second, before the Guidelines, judges applied a prepon-
derance standard for sentencing factors,38 and there is no reason to
impose a higher burden of proof under the Guidelines.3 9 However,
it is far from clear that this analysis comports with Supreme Court
doctrine on the constitutionally required burden of proof in crimi-
nal proceedings or with the Court's general due process jurispru-
dence. Both of these issues deserve closer scrutiny; this Comment
will first consider the Court's decisions on the burden of proof in
criminal proceedings.
tors at a sentencing hearing, and that under the Guidelines, that standard should continue
to suffice. The Committee did suggest, however, that with regard to "high impact issues,"
courts might have to apply a higher standard of proof. Judicial Conference Probation Com-
mittee, Federal Judicial Center In-Court-Educational Program on Guideline Sentencing
Orientation, Recommended Procedures for Guideline Sentencing and Commentary, re-
printed in Feinberg, Federal Sentencing Guidelines at 782. Unfortunately, the term "high
impact issue" was not defined in the report and no subsequent report appears to explain the
term. In any event, the final version of the Guidelines is silent on the issue of burden of
proof.
SO See, for example, United States v Blanco, 888 F2d 907 (1st Cir 1989); United States
v Guerra, 888 F2d 247 (2d Cir 1989); United States v McDowell, 888 F2d 285 (3d Cir 1989);
United States v Harris, 882 F2d 902 (4th Cir 1989); United States v Taplette, 872 F2d 101
(5th Cir 1989); United States v Silverman, 889 F2d 1531 (6th Cir 1989); United States v
White, 888 F2d 490 (7th Cir 1990); United States v Ehret, 885 F2d 441 (8th Cir 1989);
United States v Wilson, 900 F2d 1350 (9th Cir 1990); United States v Fredericks, 887 F2d
494 (10th Cir 1990); United States v Scroggins, 880 F2d 1204 (11th Cir 1989); United
States v Burke, 888 F2d 862 (DC Cir 1989). But see United States v Davis, 715 F Supp
1473 (C D Cal 1989), disapproved of by United States v Rafferty, 911 F2d 227 (9th Cir
1990). For a discussion of the general use and effect of the preponderance standard at sen-
tencing, see Robert E. Hanlon, The Second Circuit Review-1986-1987 Term: Criminal
Procedure: Hard Time Lightly Given: The Standard of Persuasion at Sentencing: United
States v. Lee a/k/a "Monkey", 54 Brooklyn L Rev 465 (1988).
37 See, for example, Williams, 880 F2d 804; Koonce, 884 F2d 349.
33 See, for example, United States v Lee, 818 F2d 1052 (2d Cir 1987).
39 See, for example, McDowell, 888 F2d 285; Guerra, 888 F2d 247. One court has dis-
agreed, holding that the Guidelines are unconstitutional because of the general lack of pro-
cedural safeguards at sentencing. In dictum, this court also stated that even if preponder-
ance were the appropriate standard, the Guidelines would remain unconstitutional. Davis,
715 F Supp 1473. Subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions, however, question the authority of
Davis. See, for example, Wilson, 900 F2d 1350.
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II. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
PREPONDERANCE STANDARD UNCLEAR
Supreme Court interpretations indicate that the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution mandates a minimum standard of proof
in criminal proceedings, and the Court's decisions establish a
framework for determining whether the Due Process Clause re-
quires a standard higher than preponderance of the evidence under
the Guidelines. These cases call into question the reasoning em-
ployed by lower courts addressing the constitutionality of the pre-
ponderance standard under the Guidelines, but they do not con-
clusively determine the constitutionally required burden of proof
at sentencing under the Guidelines.40
A. Burden of Proof Requirements in Criminal Proceedings
In In re Winship,41 the Supreme Court held that due process
requires that every factor necessary to convict a defendant of a
crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.42 In reaching this de-
cision, the Court relied on the historical tradition of American law
and the need for confidence in the criminal law system.4" In a con-
curring opinion, Justice Harlan explained that under the American
system of criminal justice it is better to allow a guilty man to go
free than to convict an innocent man.""
Elaborating on this requirement in Mullaney v Wilbur, the
Court struck down a Maine murder statute that presumed the
presence of malice aforethought unless the defendant proved he
acted in the heat of passion.45 The Court held this scheme uncon-
stitutional, stating that the prosecution must "prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provo-
cation, ' 4 because malice aforethought was an element of the crime
10 The Supreme Court recently upheld the Guidelines against constitutional challenges
based upon separation of powers and unlawful delegation, Mistretta, 489 US 361, but the
Court has yet to address the constitutionality of a preponderance standard at sentencing.
Another possible due process attack on the Guidelines is that defendants do not receive an
individually determined sentence. See Bradford C. Mank, Do the United States Sentencing
Guidelines Deprive Defendants of Due Process?, 37 Drake L Rev 377 (1987-88).
41 397 US 358 (1970).
42 Id at 364.
43 Id.
4 Id at 372.
45 421 US 684 (1975). If defendant could prove heat of passion, the court would reduce
the charge to manslaughter.
46 Id at 704.
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of murder in Maine. Yet a year later, in Patterson v New York,4
the Court upheld a New York murder statute that placed on the
defendant the burden of proving that his actions were attributable
to extreme emotional disturbance."' The Court held that this allo-
cation of burden of proof did not violate the Due Process Clause
because it did not require the defendant to prove an actual ele-
ment of the crime.4 9 The Patterson Court, however, did prescribe
some limits on a state's ability to define a crime. A legislature can-
not declare someone "'presumptively guilty of a crime'" nor can a
legislature "'validly command that the finding of an indictment, or
mere proof of the identity of the accused, [creates] a presumption
of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt.' ,,50
Against this legal backdrop the Court decided McMillan v
Pennsylvania.5 1 McMillan was charged and convicted of aggra-
vated assault. Pennsylvania law imposed a five-year minimum sen-
tence on defendants who visibly possessed a firearm during the
commission of certain felonies.52 The trial court determined at sen-
tencing, by preponderance of the evidence, whether a visible fire-
arm was present." Thus, a defendant receives this mandatory sen-
tence based on a fact not an element of the crime, and not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania sentencing scheme by a 5-4
vote.
In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist first reiterated
Winship: "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
47 432 US 197 (1977).
"8 For a discussion of how to resolve Mullaney and Patterson, see Ferdinand M. Dutile,
The Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Comment on the Mullaney-Patterson Doctrine,
55 Notre Dame Lawyer 380 (1980). For the view that Mullaney extended due process pro-
tection too far, and Patterson was a correction of the Court's error, see Ronald J. Allen, The
Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases
After Patterson v. New York, 76 Mich L Rev 30 (1977). For a discussion of the proposition
that Patterson incorrectly did away with the constitutionally mandated protection of the
Due Process Clause, see Marina Angel, Substantive Due Process and the Criminal Law, 9
Loyola U Chi L J 61, 93-111 (1977). See also Mark W. McLane, The Burden of Proof in
Criminal Cases: Mullaney and Patterson Compared, 15 Crim L Bull 346 (1979).
' The Court reasoned that the New York statute was constitutional, because if the
state has the greater power to punish someone for killing another, then it also has the lesser
power not to recognize emotional distress as a mitigating circumstance at all. Thus, requir-
ing the defendant to bear the burden of proving emotional distress is constitutionally per-
missible. Patterson, 432 US at 209.
11 Id at 210 (citations omitted).
51 477 US 79 (1986).




fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. '54
Distinguishing Winship, the Court rejected the argument that pos-
sessing a gun was an element of the crime, reasoning that "visible
possession of a firearm is [instead] .. .a sentencing factor that
comes into play only after the defendant has been found guilty of
one of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. '55 Additionally,
Rehnquist noted that judges traditionally have wide discretion in
sentencing convicted defendants, and thus held that a state legisla-
ture did not offend the Due Process Clause by providing concrete
guidance to a trial court on how to exercise its discretion. 6 The
Court upheld the Pennsylvania statute.8
Although the majority rejected the argument that a higher
standard of proof was necessary under the Pennsylvania scheme,
the Court did indicate that other situations might require a higher
standard of proof. Justice Rehnquist stated:
[I]n certain limited circumstances Winship's reasonable-
doubt requirement applies to facts not formally identified as
elements of the offense charged .... While we have never at-
tempted to define precisely the constitutional limits noted in
Patterson, i.e., the extent to which due process forbids the re-
allocation or reduction of burdens of proof in criminal cases,
and do not do so today, we are persuaded by several factors
that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act
does not exceed those limits. 58
While not expressly setting forth a test to determine when the Due
Process Clause would require a higher standard of proof,5 the
McMillan, 477 US at 84, quoting Winship, 397 US at 364.
's Id at 85-86. In rejecting the argument that possessing a gun was an element of the
crime, the Court had to reconcile its decisions in Mullaney and Patterson. The majority
emphasized the formal differences between the statutory language in the two cases, id at 84-
86, and stressed that the principal teaching of Patterson was that the "state need not 'prove
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to
recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or
the severity of the punishment.'" Id at 84, quoting Patterson, 432 US at 207.
56 Id at 92.
57 In dissent, Justice Stevens rejected the approach adopted by the majority. Instead,
Stevens made a distinction with which all four of the dissenters agreed: "if a State provides
that a specific component of a prohibited transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma
and to a special punishment, that component must be treated as a 'fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime' within the meaning of our holding in In re Winship." McMillan, 477 US at
103 (Stevens dissenting).
8A Id at 86.
5 It is also unclear whether the court intended that the presence of these factors would
merely suggest a standard higher than preponderance or would in fact require proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. The Court's rejection of the clear and convincing standard, 477 US at 92
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Court did note the absence of several factors, which, if present,
might have mandated a higher standard.6
First, the Court noted that the mandatory five-year sentence
was within the statutory maximum for aggravated assault.61 The
Court reasoned that the five-year minimum "operate[d] solely to
limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within
the range already available to it without the special finding of visi-
ble possession of a firearm. '6 2 The Court explained that if visible
possession exposed a defendant to punishment outside this range,
then the defendant's claim-that due process required a higher
standard of proof-would have more merit.6 3
Second, the Court emphasized that "the statute gives no im-
pression of having been tailored to permit the visible possession
finding to be a tail that wags the dog of the substantive offense. "64
While the Court did not indicate exactly what would constitute "a
tail wagging the dog," it implied that if a statute met this criteria,
due process might require a higher standard of proof.
Third, the Court noted that Pennsylvania was not trying to
evade Winship by not defining the presence of a gun as an element
of the crime.6 5 According to the Court, the Pennsylvania legislature
had merely "[taken] one factor that has always been considered by
sentencing courts to bear on punishment-the instrumentality
used in committing a violent felony-and dictated the precise
weight to be given that factor if the instrumentality is a firearm. "66
The Court left open the possibility that if a sentencing practice
was an attempt to evade the Winship requirements, then it may be
subject to a higher burden of proof.
Current Supreme Court doctrine indicates that the Due Proc-
ess Clause requires a standard higher than preponderance only in
certain circumstances. If a particular factor is an element of the
crime, proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be satisfied. Alterna-
n 8, suggests that the Court may have contemplated only a burden of proof higher than
preponderance. See Section III.B.
60 One factor noted by the Court, but not explored in this Comment, is the ability of a
legislature to define a crime to consist of so few elements that a defendant is presumptively
guilty unless he proves otherwise. McMillan, 477 US at 86-87, citing Patterson, 432 US at
210.
61 The statutory maximum for aggravated assault was 10 years. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann
§§ 1103(2), 2702(a)(1) (Purdon 1982).
62 McMillan, 477 US at 88.
03 Id at 87-88.
6, Id.
65 Id at 89-90.
6 Id at 89.
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tively, if one or more of the three McMillan exceptions applies, a
standard higher than preponderance may be constitutionally
required.
B. Use of a Preponderance Standard Under the Guidelines May
Be Inconsistent with McMillan
Determining the base offense level and calculating adjust-
ments to it raise issues that the McMillan majority indicated could
require a burden of proof higher than preponderance. Both find-
ings require the judge to make factual determinations that subject
the defendant to greater punishment, that function as "tails that
wag the dog of the substantive offense," and that evade the re-
quirements of Winship.
1. Greater punishment.
In order to understand how factual findings under the Guide-
lines may subject a defendant to greater punishment, it is useful to
compare the federal regime to Pennsylvania's system of sentencing
guidelines for trial judges." Like the Federal Guidelines, the Penn-
sylvania Guidelines consider both the particular crime of the de-
fendant and the defendant's criminal history, in order to deter-
mine the applicable minimum range (analogous to the actual
sentence range obtained from applying the matrices of the Federal
Guidelines)." Unlike the Federal Guidelines, however, the Penn-
sylvania Guidelines only prescribe minimum sentence ranges.6 9
The Pennsylvania trial judge may depart from this minimum
range to impose a higher sentence if he has reasons to justify a
departure. Pennsylvania courts interpret the trial judge's discre-
tion to depart from the state's minimum guideline range much
more expansively than federal courts interpret the trial judge's dis-
cretion to depart from the Federal Guidelines. In Pennsylvania,
the judge has discretion to depart from the state guidelines, as long
as the sentence he imposes is withinthe theoretical statutory max-
imum (the maximum amount of time a defendant could spend in
prison if he were found guilty of a certain crime), he states his
reasons on the record, and the sentence reflects three general con-
cerns: the need to protect the public, the gravity of the offense (in-
cluding the impact of the crime on the victim), and the rehabilita-
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tive needs of the defendant.70 Thus, the Pennsylvania trial judge
has the discretionary power to impose the theoretical statutory
maximum sentence for a given crime on a particular defendant. In
McMillan, the court properly used the theoretical statutory maxi-
mum as a baseline against which to determine whether a finding of
visible possession of a firearm led to additional punishment, be-
cause the trial judge had discretion to sentence a particular de-
fendant to this maximum.
The McMillan reasoning technically applies to the Guidelines,
because all sentences imposed under the Guidelines are subject to
a theoretical statutory maximum for the particular crime of which
the defendant has been convicted. Unlike the Pennsylvania
scheme, however, the theoretical statutory maximum in federal
sentencing is not a realistic option for federal trial judges;71 the
standard a federal judge must satisfy before he can depart from
the Federal Guidelines' range is much higher than that of the
Pennsylvania trial judge.72 Under the Federal Guidelines, the theo-
retical statutory maximum is not a sensible baseline for due pro-
cess analysis.
The Guidelines require a judge to impose a sentence within a
very small ranges which is set by the judge's own findings on the
quantity of contraband and the defendant's criminal history cate-
gory. Although the Guidelines do leave some room for departing
from this range, courts have interpreted this discretionary power
very narrowly.7 4 Thus, a federal judge's discretion under the
70 Commissioner v Smith, 369 Pa Super 1, 534 A2d 836 (1987); Commissioner v Cruz
Ortega, 372 Pa Super 389, 394, 539 A2d 849 (1988).
71 If the federal judge can demonstrate that factors exist justifying a departure, he can
impose a sentence outside the Guideline range, but as previously suggested, this is a very
high standard to meet. In White, the Seventh Circuit noted that a sentence is imposed
within the Guideline range in 82% of all cases. 888 F2d at 498, citing United States Sen-
tencing Commission, 1988 Annual Report 37-38 (GPO, 1989). The latest annual report con-
firms this figure. United States Sentencing Commission, 1989 Annual Report 59 (GPO,
1990).
7 Although it is true that sentences under the Federal Guidelines are much shorter on
average than sentences that trial judges imposed in federal courts before the Guidelines, this
comparison is misleading. When a defendant receives a sentence under the Federal Guide-
lines the defendant will serve the full length of the sentence without any possibility that
parole will shorten the sentence. Before the Federal Guidelines, the parole option made the
sentence actually served by a defendant much shorter than that imposed by the court.
Guidelines Manual, ch 1 at 3 (cited in note 2).
11 See notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
U See United States v Aguilar-Pena, 887 F2d 347, 349-50 (1st Cir 1989); United States
v Coe, 891 F2d 405, 413 n 9 (2d Cir 1989); United States v Rivalta, 892 F2d 223 (2d Cir
1989); United States v McDowell, 902 F2d 451 (6th Cir 1990); United States v Schmude,
901 F2d 555 (7th Cir 1990). Compare Taplette, 872 F2d at 106; Ryan, 866 F2d at 609-10.
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Guidelines stands in stark contrast to that allowed a state judge
under the Pennsylvania sentencing scheme.
Unlike a Pennsylvania judge's finding of the visible possession
of a firearm, a finding of a certain quantity of contraband does
expose a federal defendant to greater punishment. With drug
crimes, if the trial judge finds that the amount of drugs involved in
the crime is greater than that proven at trial, the defendant's base
offense level, and therefore his sentence, increases. In contrast to
the Pennsylvania judge's finding of a visible firearm in McMillan,
these decisions do not merely establish the minimum sentence for
a convicted defendant. Rather, these findings in fact determine the
defendant's sentence, because the trial judge can only deviate from
the Guidelines' range in narrow circumstances. These findings,
then, expose a defendant to greater punishment. Unlike the Penn-
sylvania judge's finding in McMillan, a federal judge's findings do
more than limit the range already available to the court. The fed-
eral judge's findings at sentencing set the "range" available to the
judge.
Thus, under the Federal Guidelines, the relevant baseline
against which to judge whether certain factual determinations
merit extra punishment is the actual sentence that a defendant
with a particular base offense level and criminal history will receive
under the Guidelines. 5 If one uses this baseline, a finding of extra
drugs, which increases the base offense level, does subject a de-
fendant to a greater level of punishment. Similarly, if a defend-
ant's base offense level is adjusted upward due to aggravating cir-
cumstances, then the facts underlying the upward adjustment also
lead to a greater punishment. Because these factual findings have
the potential to increase sentences, they should arguably be sub-
ject to a standard of proof greater than preponderance under
McMillan.
2. Tail wagging the dog.
Another factor the McMillan Court noted might warrant a
higher burden of proof is whether the factual determination was
71 This is the appropriate baseline, because it is really the only sentencing option avail-
able to the trial judge. To measure a defendant's sentence against a backdrop which in
practice is not an available option seems questionable at best. There are two important
qualifications to this rule. First, for any given offense level and criminal history category,
the judge has discretion within a sentencing range. However, the range is so slight that this
aspect of judicial discretion is all but meaningless. See note 14. Second, as discussed at note
15, the Guidelines do allow for departure in limited circumstances. In practice such depar-
ture rarely occurs. See note 71. This is significantly different from the Pennsylvania sentenc-
ing scheme at issue in McMillan.
1990]
The University of Chicago Law Review
really a "tail that wagged the dog of the substantive offense." The
McMillan Court probably contemplated a situation in which the
factual determinations made at sentencing so control the punish-
ment decisions that they, rather than the elements of the substan-
tive offense, become the prime criteria in fixing punishment. De-
termining the base offense level and adjustments seems to
exemplify this phenomenon because of the effect of these determi-
nations on punishment.
In order to calculate the base offense level, a court needs to
know the amount of drugs or money involved in the crime. Accord-
ingly, the quantity of contraband determines the sentence. The de-
termination of adjustments also contributes to the fixing of pun-
ishment. Each adjustment will change the base offense level and
consequently the sentence imposed.
Under the Pennsylvania Guidelines, a trial judge could sen-
tence a defendant not possessing a firearm to an equal or longer
term than a defendant possessing a firearm. This potential overlap
suggests that the determination of the gun's presence is not a cru-
cial element to sentencing in Pennsylvania. The elements of the
substantive offense set the maximum sentence, and a trial judge
retains the discretion to set the sentence based on a number of
factors. In this way, the "dog" (the substantive elements) wags the
"tail" (the factors allowing adjustment).
However, the same is not true under the Federal Guidelines.
Consider a defendant, with no prior criminal history nor circum-
stances warranting an adjustment to the base offense level, charged
with illegal possession of base cocaine. If the court convicts the de-
fendant of possessing one gram of cocaine, the base offense level
will be 18. This translates into a sentence of 27-33 months.76 If, on
the other hand, a judge finds at sentencing that the amount of
drugs actually involved in the transaction was 35 grams, the base
offense level will be 30, translating into a sentence of 97-121
months." The sentence imposed for one gram of base cocaine does
not overlap with that imposed for 35 grams.78 This same argument
applies to adjustments to the base offense level. 9
7' Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(13) (cited in note 2).
77 Id at § 2D1.1(c)(7).
78 Id. In fact, the sentences do not overlap even when the comparison is between one
gram of cocaine and three grams of cocaine, which under the same assumptions, will be 41-
51 months. § 2D1.1(c)(11).
7' For example, if the defendant in the above example was found to have had a firearm
present during the transaction, his base offense level would have been 20 for 1 gram of base
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Thus, under the Guidelines' sentencing system, the elements
of the substantive offense may be less important than other factors
considered by the judge. The sentence of a defendant convicted of
cocaine possession is determined for the most part by the quantity
of cocaine, a factual inquiry by the judge at sentencing. The ab-
sence of any common range between the sentences in the above
example suggests that the quantity of cocaine is in fact a "tail"
that "wags the dog" of the substantive offense of cocaine
possession.
3. Evading Winship.
The Guidelines' scheme also evades the requirements of Win-
ship. Consider a scenario in which the government charges a de-
fendant with two related counts of drug possession."0 The defend-
ant pleads guilty to the first count in exchange for the government
dropping the second count. If the judge determines that the count
dismissed was part of the same course of conduct as the count
under which the court convicted the defendant, the defendant will
receive the same punishment as if found guilty of both counts, be-
cause under § 3D1.2 the court would aggregate the quantities of
the two original counts.81 The government thus evades the burden
of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the defend-
ant committed the second count; yet, under the lesser burden of
preponderance, the government achieves the same result by estab-
lishing the presence of the drugs at sentencing.8 2 This evades the
Winship requirement that every element of the crime be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The same argument applies to adjustments to the base offense
level. Consider a defendant charged with a drug offense and a gun
offense. At trial, the jury acquits him of the gun offense but con-
cocaine, translating into a sentence of 33-41 months. Without a firearm, his sentence would
be 27-33 months. Similarly, for 35 grams of base cocaine, defendant will receive a sentence
of 97-121 months if he does not have a gun, and a sentence of 121-151 months (base offense
level of 32) if he does have a gun. Id at § 2D1.1(b)(1).
SO This precise situation is an example in the Trainer's Manual. See note 27.
Si See text at notes 23-27 for an explanation of § 3D1.2.
SI This argument was advanced by the defendant in United States v Fernandez, 877
F2d 1138 (2d Cir 1989). The defendant, as part of a plea agreement, decided to plead guilty
to a lesser charge involving a smaller amount of cocaine. At the time of the plea, the judge
told the defendant that he was still subject to the theoretical statutory maximum for the
crime initially charged. At sentencing, the judge included the full amount of drugs specified
in the initial charge. The Second Circuit upheld the sentence because the defendant in fact
received a sentence less than the theoretical statutory maximum. See also Silet and Bren-
ner, 77 J Crim L & Criminol 1069 (cited in note 33).
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victs him of the drug offense. At sentencing, if the judge believes
by preponderance that the gun was involved in the transaction, he
can adjust the base offense level upward to reflect the presence of
the gun.83 This too evades the Winship requirement of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
The Guidelines' method of calculating both the base offense
level and adjustments satisfies the factors enumerated in McMil-
lan, each of which may warrant a burden of proof higher than pre-
ponderance. The Court in that case explicitly refused to adopt a
bright-line test, however, only mentioning factors that might pro-
duce a different result. Moreover, the McMillan opinion does not
make clear whether the presence of these factors mandates proof
beyond a reasonable doubt or merely a standard higher than pre-
ponderance.8 4 One must therefore embark upon a more general due
process analysis in order to ascertain the correct evidentiary
standard.
III. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE SUPPORTS CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE AS THE PROPER STANDARD AT SENTENCING
McMillan fails to provide a clear answer to the burden of
proof issue because the Pennsylvania statute is an inadequate
analogy for the Guidelines. This inadequacy stems from the funda-
mental differences between the Guidelines' sentencing regime and
the Pennsylvania regime at issue in McMillan. Previous Supreme
Court decisions on the burden of proof in criminal cases involved
sentencing schemes in which the trial judge enjoyed a large
amount of discretion; such discretion does not exist under the
Guidelines. 5 With a discretionary approach, a judge not only
" The Fifth Circuit upheld this result in United States v Juarez-Ortega, 866 F2d 747
(5th Cir 1989). See Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (cited in note 2).
8 The evasion of Winship factor, while relevant, is not dispositive of this issue. Be-
cause Winship only prescribes proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it is difficult to equate
evasion of Winship with anything less than this standard. However, the Court seemed to
distinguish an attempt to evade Winship with an outright violation of Winship. The Court
has applied quite formal distinctions in this area in the past (Patterson/Mullaney), and it
may do so again in this context, holding that while this factor evades Winship, it does not
violate Winship. In these situations, factual determinations may require reasonable doubt
or an intermediate standard of proof between preponderance and beyond a reasonable
doubt.
" Drawing an even starker contrast to the federal judge's lack of discretion under the
Guidelines (see text at notes 75-77), under Pennsylvania law both the judge and prosecutor
have discretion to decide whether to invoke the provision mandating a five-year minimum




weighs a wider array of considerations, he also factors into the sen-
tencing calculus his relative degree of certainty relating to each
consideration." Under the Guidelines, however, judges must assign
fixed weights to factual determinations at sentencing, regardless of
their relative degree of certainty (as long as the preponderance
standard is met); the presence of discretion makes the McMillan
decision meaningfully different. Because of this inadequacy, one
must apply a more general due process analysis, which suggests
that in implementing the Guidelines trial judges should adopt
clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof at
sentencing.
A. Due Process Framework
Sentencing following conviction presents unique due process
concerns, which can be analyzed using the framework enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Mathews v Eldridge.87 The analysis re-
quires balancing three factors: the private interest, the risk of erro-
neous deprivation or the value of additional safeguards, and the
governmental interest.8 8 The private interest implicated at sen-
tencing under the Guidelines is the serving of an erroneously long
sentence. The risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of addi-
tional safeguards relate to the question of whether the defendant
will suffer an erroneously long sentence if a lower burden of proof
is applied. The governmental interest is the economic and deter-
rence costs of a higher burden of proof. The ultimate result under
Mathews depends on how one reconciles these three considera-
tions. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the role of the burden of
proof indicates that clear and convincing evidence is the proper
86 This was precisely the argument of the district court in Davis, 715 F Supp at 1479,
and is similar to Silet and Brenner's argument, 77 J Crim L & Criminol at 1079 (cited in
note 33).
87 424 US 319, 335 (1976).
" While Mathews does not clearly apply to criminal sentencing cases-the case itself
concerned social security benefits-circuit courts have applied these three factors in the
criminal sentencing context. See, for example, United States v Barnerd, 887 F2d 841, 843
(8th Cir 1989); United States v Lee, 818 F2d 1052, 1056 (2d Cir 1987); United States v
Pugliese, 805 F2d 1117, 1122-23 (2d Cir 1986); United States v Davis, 710 F2d 104, 107 (3d
Cir 1983). Additionally, while the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted the Mathews
test in this setting, no language in Mathews appears to limit the test to the administrative
hearing context. Indeed, the factors enunciated in this balancing test are the precise issues
that must arise in any due process analysis. One commentator has noted the similarity be-
tween the Mathews opinion and the reasoning of the Court in Patterson. Comment, Fifth
Amendment-Due Process Rights at Sentencing, 77 J Crim L & Criminol 646, 662-63
(1986).
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constitutional standard for resolving sentencing factors under the
Guidelines.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Addington v Texas 9 clearly
states the two purposes of the burden of proof. First, it serves to
"'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclu-
sions for a particular type of adjudication.' "90 In the context of the
Guidelines, this concern translates into how much certainty the
criminal justice system ought to demand in determining the facts
relevant to the length of a sentence. Second, the standard chosen
"serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to
indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate
decision. ' ' 91
There are three basic evidentiary standards available: prepon-
derance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt. These three standards constitute
a continuum, with the least restrictive standard-preponderance-
applied to civil cases because "society has a minimal concern with
the outcome of such private suits,"92 and the most restrictive stan-
dard-beyond a reasonable doubt-applied to criminal determina-
tions of guilt because "the interests of the defendant are of such
magnitude that historically and without any explicitly constitu-
tional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof
designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erro-
neous judgment."' 3 Clear and convincing evidence is an intermedi-
ate standard appropriate when "the interest[s] at stake . . . are
deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money .... ,,.1 In
Addington, the Court held that the Due Process Clause required
the use of a clear and convincing standard in order to civilly con-
fine a person "involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state
mental hospital," reasoning that the loss of liberty of the person
was an interest that was more substantial than the loss of money. 5
89 441 US 418 (1978).
Id at 423 (citations omitted).
9 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id at 423-24.
94 Id at 424.
" Id at 420. For other instances where the clear and convincing standard is applied, see
California v Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 US 90, 93 (1981) (per curiam). The
areas include libel, deportation, and denaturalization.
1406 [57:1387
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
B. Adoption of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
The burden of proof at sentencing for a criminal offense does
not fit neatly into this continuum. Traditional Court doctrine re-
quires the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for criminal pro-
ceedings, but such Court decisions only treat determinations of
guilt.98 At sentencing, the guilt of the defendant is not at issue.
But while the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is not clearly
applicable, neither are the preponderance or clear and convincing
standards, because courts have rarely applied either of these stan-
dards outside the civil law context.9 7 Balancing the relevant factors
identified in the Mathews analysis, however, dictates that clear
and convincing evidence is the appropriate standard.
The private interest of the defendant supports a high standard
of proof. A lower standard of proof may cause an error in a factual
determination needed to calculate the base offense level or an ad-
justment to the base offense level and thereby lead to a longer sen-
tence.98 If due process demands that some guilty people may go
free because of the risk of convicting an innocent person, it may
also demand that some defendants receive erroneously short
sentences to counteract the risk of other defendants receiving erro-
neously long sentences. The underlying interest that the Winship
Court found so important was the protection of liberty. The de-
fendant's interest in not receiving an erroneously long sentence is
similar to his interest in not being falsely convicted; both involve
the wrongful taking of liberty. Because the factual determinations
in question at the sentencing hearing determine the length and the
range of a sentence, Winship may require as a subsidiary principle
" There is one important exception. In United States v Salerno, 481 US 739 (1987),
the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat
1976, codified at 18 USC §§ 3141-50 (1988). Under this act, an arrestee may be detained if,
after a hearing,
the judicial officer finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably assure the
safety of other persons and the community, [and] he must state his findings of fact in
writing, § 3142(i), and support his conclusion with clear and convincing evidence,
§ 3142(f).
481 US at 742 (emphasis added). While the Court sustained the constitutionality of the Bail
Reform Act with clear and convincing evidence as the burden of proof, the Court did not
analyze clear and convincing evidence itself as a due process issue.
'7 The clear exception is McMillan. However, the Court in McMillan did not hold that
the Due Process Clause required preponderance, but rather that preponderance satisfied
due process concerns. See 477 US at 91.
98 Throughout this section no distinction is drawn between the base offense level and
adjustments to the base offense level. The analysis for base offense level and adjustments
should be the same because an error in either will increase or decrease the sentence. See text
at notes 13-20 for a more complete discussion.
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that the social benefit of not imposing an erroneously long sen-
tence is worth the social cost of imposing an erroneously short sen-
tence. The Addington Court also understood that the private lib-
erty interest implicated by a civil commitment proceeding is
protected by the Due Process Clause, and requires proof by clear
and convincing evidence."9
In addition, as Justice Rehnquist points out in McMillan, the
concern about erroneous deprivation at sentencing is not as great
as it is at trial, because the defendant has already been found
guilty.100 The level of risk one is willing to tolerate is higher, be-
cause the question is not about whether the accused will go to
prison, but rather how long he will stay in prison. Even though it is
possible for defendants to receive distinct sentences depending on
how one resolves issues in calculating the base offense level, 1 ' and
even though it is true that these determinations are like elements
of the crime, it is nevertheless true that the court has convicted the
defendant of certain culpable activity. The determinations made at
sentencing either go to the base offense level or to adjustments to
the base offense level. Because these determinations relate to as-
pects of the defendant's conduct (which has already been proven
culpable), the risk of error in calculating the base offense level and
adjustments is more tolerable than the risk of error in determining
guilt itself. The Addington Court reasoned similarly in holding
that it was permissible to allow greater error in civilly confining a
person than convicting a person of a criminal offense. 0 2 Thus, this
factor suggests that a standard lower than beyond a reasonable
doubt may be sufficient.
Finally, one must evaluate the cost to the prosecution of a
higher burden of proof. At first glance, this factor seems to support
a lower standard. Potential costs of a higher burden of proof in-
clude expending extra prosecutorial resources, added judicial work-
load, and erroneously short sentences. And if the trial judge is re-
quired to resolve many factors to a higher degree of certainty, the
sentencing hearing might overwhelm the trial.
These costs may be minimal under the Guidelines, however,
because the calculation of the base offense level for drug and
money crimes depends primarily on the quantity of contraband in-
volved in the crime. Moreover, there are only a limited number of
" Addington, 441 US at 425-27.
100 McMillan, 477 US at 83-84.
101 See Section II.B.2.
102 Addington, 441 US at 429.
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specific factors that the court must consider in calculating any ad-
justment to the base offense-level. These adjustments are each dis-
crete questions of fact, such as whether a gun was present," 3
whether drugs were present, 10 4 or whether the victim was a law en-
forcement officer. 10 5 Because of the small number of discrete fac-
tual questions that the court must answer to calculate the base of-
fense level and any adjustments, the costs of answering these
questions will not be overly burdensome to the government. 06 Fur-
thermore, because the number of factual determinations that the
judge must make at sentencing is quite limited, it is unlikely that
the sentencing hearing would overwhelm the trial. 0 7
In the end, it seems that clear and convincing evidence is the
most appropriate standard to apply in the Guidelines' context, just
as it was in Addington. In Addington, the Court had to wrestle
with the loss of liberty from civil confinement. The Court, in re-
jecting a preponderance standard, understood the importance of
this liberty interest and how it differed from a mere monetary in-
terest. The Court reasoned that "[o]ne who is suffering from a
debilitating mental illness and in need of treatment is neither
wholly at liberty nor free of stigma."' 08 The Court also understood,
however, that the interest involved did not implicate issues of guilt
or innocence. The Court thus rejected the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, reserving that standard for determinations of guilt
in a criminal trial. 09 The Court adopted a clear and convincing
103 Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (cited in note 2).
104 Id at § 2B.1(b)(2).
101 Id at § 3A1.2.
100 With respect to the base offense level, see id at § 2BL.1 (larceny, embezzlement, and
other forms of theft) and § 2D1.1 (unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, or traffick-
ing). The types of factors which can adjust a base offense level applicable to all crimes
include victim-related adjustments (see § 3A1.1-vulnerable victim; § 3A1.2-official victim;
§ 3A1.3-restraint of victim), role in the offense adjustments (see § 3B.1-aggravating role;
§ 3B1.2-mitigating role; § 3B1.3-abuse of position of trust or use of special skill), and
obstruction adjustments (see § 3C.1-willfully obstructing or impeding proceedings). There
are a few additional factors for each specific offense. For example, the specific offense char-
acteristics for larceny and embezzlement are whether a firearm or drugs were present,
whether the theft was from another person, whether US mail was taken, whether it involved
more than minimal planning, or whether the crime involved organized criminal activity. See
§ 2B1.1. For drug crimes, the only specific offense characteristic is whether the defendant
possessed a firearm during the offense. See § 2D1.1(b)(1). For money crimes, the Guidelines
are written to make the amount of money involved in the offense a specific offense charac-
teristic. See § 2B1.1.
107 See notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
1*1 Addington, 441 US at 429.
I"' Specifically, the Court understood a civil commitment proceeding to be different,
because it was not punitive in nature. The Court also noted that it may be impossible to
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standard because this "middle level of burden of proof [] strikes a
fair balance between the rights of the individual and the legitimate
concerns of the state."110
Similarly, under the Guidelines the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence is not at issue, and thus beyond a reasonable doubt seems
inappropriate. The system is willing to tolerate a higher degree of
error in this context. Yet, it is equally true that the interest in-
volved (avoiding an erroneously long sentence) is quite important
to individual liberty""' and should be valued as a derivative rule of
Winship. Just as preponderance was not sufficient to civilly con-
fine a person, it is not sufficient to deprive a defendant of liberty at
sentencing.
A clear and convincing standard is sensitive to these compet-
ing concerns in the Guidelines' context. As the constitutional anal-
ysis above makes clear, at sentencing the judge must resolve fac-
tual issues that expose the defendant to greater punishment, which
essentially become elements of the crime, and which may in effect
evade Winship.12 This analysis is relevant even if the preponder-
ance standard does satisfy due process, because the Guidelines
delegate the burden of proof decision to the discretion of the trial
judge. In excercising this discretion, judges should take the consid-
erations discussed in this Comment into account. The clear and
convincing evidence standard is the appropriate burden of proof
for resolving these factual issues because it effectively balances the
satisfy the necessary elements of civil commitment if the standard is beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id at 428-29.
110 Id at 431. The Bail Reform Act (see note 96) is also the result of balancing societal
interests with those of the defendant. In the following passage, Congress explains how it
designed the act to be sensitive to these concerns:
While a deprivation of liberty of up to ten days is a serious matter, it must be balanced
against the fact that the defendant has been arrested based on probable cause to be-
lieve that he has committed a crime, the fact that he is either already on conditional
release... or he is not in conformity with the immigration laws, and the fact that the
court must find that he may flee or pose a danger to any other person or the commu-
nity if released. On balance the Committee concluded that a detention of up to ten
days in those circumstances is warranted and is in the interests of justice.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 17 (1988). As
noted, Congress adopted a clear and convincing standard for such determinations.
. A longer sentence does increase the accompanying stigma as well. The dissent in
McMillan sought to adopt the test that whenever a factor resulted in imposing a special
stigma or special punishment it should be subject to a higher burden of proof. Moreover, the
risk in the Guidelines cases may be more severe than the risk in McMillan, because of the
lack of judicial discretion in the former. The Court stated in Addington, "[i]n cases involv-
ing individual rights, whether criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum]
reflects the value society places on individual liberty.'" 441 US at 425 (citations omitted).
12 See Section II.B.
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interests of the defendant against the relevant governmental
concerns.
CONCLUSION
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a judge must consider ac-
tions of the defendant for which the defendant was not convicted
or charged but which can result in a longer sentence. While the
Guidelines are silent on the standard of proof for such actions,
courts have applied a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Preponderance, however, may violate due process. The factors
noted by the Supreme Court in McMillan suggest that under the
Due Process Clause, a standard greater than preponderance might
be required. The Court's due process balancing approach suggests
that the appropriate standard is clear and convincing evidence.
The judge's decisions at sentencing do not determine guilt but
do have a substantial effect on the punishment imposed. A clear
and convincing standard uniquely balances the competing values
of the defendant's interest with the fact that the defendant has
been proven guilty.
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